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I. INTRODUCTION 
We are involved in research exploring the wholesale authority 
of bankruptcy courts to supplement the provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. By supplement, we mean to make decisions or take 
actions that are not provided for in applicable, specific statutes. 
Such a decision or action is "supplemental law." 
Our use of the phrase "supplemental law" and our research 
does not include either artful interpretation or exercises of discre-
tion that a particular statute allows. We only consider the court's 
authority to decide or act beyond, or different from, statutory pro-
visions on the basis of general authority apart from the provisions 
themselves. 
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National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. 
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critical and/or encouraging comments and suggestions. Since David Epstein ignored all of 
their suggestions, Steve Nickles bears full responsibility for any errors in this paper. 
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Our principal focus is Bankruptcy Code section 105(a), 1 which 
we'll refer to simply as 105. It allows a bankruptcy court "to issue 
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to 
carry out the provisions"2 of the Code. This section derives from 
the superseded Bankruptcy Act, section 2a(15),3 which allowed 
"courts of bankruptcy" to "make such orders, issue such process, 
and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically pro-
vided for as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provi-
sions of [the] act."4 Section 2a(15) was cited dozens of times in 
reported decisions under the old Bankruptcy Act. Section 105 of 
the Bankruptcy Code has been cited in thousands of reported 
cases as an authority to support a wide variety of judicial deci-
sions and actions. 5 
Even in the early days of the Code, in 1982, Richard Levine, 
the first Director and Counsel, Executive Office for the United 
States Trustees, warned that on the basis of 105, courts "have be-
gun to develop a concept of almost unlimited power."6 Ten years 
later, in 1992, Chaim Fortgang and Erin Enright, prominent New 
York bankruptcy practitioners, wrote that 105 ''has developed into 
the 'catchall' provision of the Bankruptcy Code. "7 This concept 
has now fully matured. Today, 105 is the authority behind an 
incredibly long list of powers now exercised by bankruptcy courts. 
Lawyers now commonly stand on 105 whenever the Code fails 
clearly to support their clients' position. They often seem to inter-
pret 105 as a boundless source of power that enables the bank-
ruptcy judge to make up the law as she goes along and, in so 
doing, to go where no member of Congress has gone before. Some 
judges and lawyers believe that 105 enables a bankruptcy court to 
hang or otherwise fit decisions within the framework of bank-
ruptcy law whether or not the bankruptcy statutes accommodate 
the decisions. 
In this article we discuss the role of 105 in bankruptcy law 
generally rather than in specific bankruptcy cases. We mention a 
few cases as examples. Mainly, we aim at 105. We work toward 
an understanding of this section that explains our view of the bot-
1 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1999). 
2 Id. 
3 Bankr. Act § 2a(15); 11 U.S.C. § 12(a)(15) (repealed). 
4 Id. 
5 To state the obvious [or at least what is obvious to us old timers] there were fewer 
bankruptcy cases and virtually no reports of the decisions of bankruptcy judges under the 
Bankruptcy Act. 
6 Richard L. Levine, An Enhanced Conception of the Bankruptcy Judge: From Case 
Administrator to Unbiased Adjudicator, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 637, 653 (1982). 
7 Chaim J. Fortgang and Erin Enright, "Carry Out the Provisions" and Section 105, 
at 3, (Paper presented at New York University Law School Workshop on Bankruptcy and 
Business Reorganization (1992)). 
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tom issue that determines the proper role and use of 105 and also 
the proper role and use of supplemental law generally. 
Our view of section 105 as a source of supplemental law is 
different from the view reflected by bankruptcy court decisions 
and actions. We do not believe that 105 authorizes "supplemental 
law." Indeed, we think 105 is largely, even completely, redundant. 
We also think that some present uses of 105 are of questionable 
constitutional validity. 
Preliminarily, in order to focus clearly on section 105 and the 
scope of authority the section gives bankruptcy courts, we sepa-
rate other possible sources of authority for bankruptcy courts to 
supplement the Bankruptcy Code. There are three such sources: 
(1) inherent power, (2) federal common law and (3) equitable na-
ture of bankruptcy courts. 
First, all courts have certain, inherent power. This power is 
real but small and limited to process closely related to the conduct 
of court and functioning process. 
Next, we consider the power of bankruptcy courts to create 
federal common law. We also consider the courts' power on the 
basis of state law to supplement the Bankruptcy Code with princi-
ples of common law and equity, especially including the principles 
of traditional equity jurisprudence. These powers exist but are 
tightly, narrowly constrained. We conclude that they are not 
sources of very wide, general authority for applying supplemental 
law under the Bankruptcy Code. 
Then we consider the legitimacy and meaning of the oft-
quoted description of bankruptcy courts as "courts of equity." We 
trace the source and find the meaning of this description. It 
means that apart from state law and as a matter of federal law, 
bankruptcy courts can apply principles of equity jurisprudence. 
These principles are an ancient source of supplemental law, but 
the principles of equity jurisprudence are doctrinally limited by 
their own terms and are also situationally limited by any applica-
ble statute that contradicts or restrains them. Moreover, these 
principles do not include any power simply to do what seems fair, 
i.e. to "do equity." Such a power requires a specific statutory li-
cense and even then is restrained by legislative purpose and judi-
cial precedent. 
Finally we get to 105 as a basis of wholesale authority for 
bankruptcy courts to supplement the provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code. The end of our search is anticlimactic. At most, and de-
pending on whom you believe, 105 merely restates the power 
given elsewhere for bankruptcy courts to issue necessary process 
and to act as courts of equity in applying principles of equity juris-
prudence. Section 105 is not itself a larger or wider or even differ-
ent source of supplemental law. 
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Many cases dispute our conclusion. They apply 105 in many 
ways that are well beyond the limits of equity jurisprudence. 
These cases make law under 105 as if the section were a delega-
tion of lawmaking power by Congress to the courts. This interpre-
tation may be supported by good policy, but it is not supported by 
statutory language. Moreover, the Constitution forbids it. In-
deed, the practice of bankruptcy courts making law in any non-
proximately, legislatively guided sense is unconstitutional under 
any congressional grant of supplemental power to the courts. It is 
unconstitutional regardless of the statutory basis of the power and 
whether or not the judicial law fits perfectly within the scope of 
the delegated power. 
II. INHERENT POWER (PROCEDURAL COMMON LAw) 
Federal district courts possess inherent authority to make 
procedural common law for the purpose of protecting "their pro-
ceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their tradi-
tional responsibilities."8 Presumably, bankruptcy courts 
derivatively share this authority. Enforcing compliance with 
court orders through the exercise of the contempt power is an ob-
vious example of a court's inherent power.9 
To a very small extent the courts' inherent authority is consti-
tutionally protected. For the most part, however, this authority 
can be controlled or overridden by Congress. Indeed, even the 
Supreme Court is constitutionally limited in establishing federal 
rules of procedures. The role of the Court in promulgating and 
maintaining the federal rules is on the basis of a congressional 
delegation of authority in the Rules Enabling Act. 10 
The Rules Enabling Act limits the Court to making rules for 
practice and procedure only. Affecting substantive rights is flatly 
prohibited, and the meaning of "substantive rights" for this pur-
pose may be growing. 11 Therefore, the courts' statutory authority 
to make procedural common law is shrinking. Also, the tiny in-
herent authority that the courts possess on their own is even more 
limited. It is not a source of meaningful supplemental law under 
the Bankruptcy Code. 
s Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 1780, 135 L. Ed. 2d 102 
(1996). 
9 See In re McLean Indus., 68 B.R. 690, 695 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("All courts ... 
have inherent contempt powers to enforce compliance with their lawful orders."). But cf 
Kellogg v. Chester, 71 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) ("[S)ection 105 in the first in-
stance grants to bankruptcy courts the power to issue final orders of contempt insofar as 
such orders are necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of title 11. "). 
10 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1994). 
11 See generally Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" an the Rules En-
abling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 47 (1998). 
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III. MAKING AND APPLYING SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAw 
A. As A Matter Of Federal Law 
Everybody remembers from the first year of law school that 
there is no federal, general, substantive common law, especially 
not in diversity cases. Erie12 and its progeny "so hold." We know 
this truth from the "canned briefs" we bought when we were first-
year law students. Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not 
common-law courts. 13 Federal courts "do not possess a general 
power to develop and apply their own rules of decision,"14 because: 
AB the general structure of the Constitution and the tenth 
amendment make clear, the framers anticipated that the fed-
eral government would exercise only specifically enumerated 
powers. All other powers were reserved to the states or the peo-
ple. The federal judiciary, as a branch of the federal govern-
ment, is also limited by this specific enumeration of powers. 
Thus, any assertion by the judiciary of a general power to make 
law would encroach upon the powers reserved to the states.15 
On the other hand, Erie does not control in matters covered by 
federal statutes. In these matters it is possible, though not cer-
tainly clear, that federal courts enjoy some little room to make 
true federal common law .16 
Moreover, federal courts make what we will call interpretative 
federal common law. Here we adopt Professor Field's rightly wide 
definition of federal common law, which is "any rule of federal law 
created by a court (usually * * * a federal court) when the sub-
stance of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactments 
- constitutional or congressional."17 Making federal common law 
probably happens most often when federal courts interpret federal 
statutes by adding gloss or inferring a rule after finding that the 
statute permits the addition or inference, either generally or with 
respect to a particular matter or issue.18 
12 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("[t]here is no federal general common 
law"). 
13 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981). 
14 Id. 
15 Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 
1, 13-14 (1985). 
16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 60 (5th ed. 1994). 
17 Martha Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REV. 
881, 890 (1986). Cf. Martin Redish, Federal Common Law and American Political Theory: 
A Response to Professor Weinberg, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 853, 857 (1989) ("When a court en-
gages in statutory interpretation, it asks 'What did the legislature intend?' When it creates 
common law, it asks 'what is the best policy choice?"'). 
18 Defining federal common law so broadly, especially including interpretation, is not 
uncommon. In fact, it is accepted. See Martha Field, supra note 17, at 890-92; Thomas W. 
Merrill, supra note 15, at 4-5. 
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Bankruptcy courts are units of the district courts. 19 Presuma-
bly, therefore, bankruptcy courts share or derivatively enjoy the 
district courts' power of making federal common law. This power, 
which is separate from 105, enables bankruptcy courts legiti-
mately to supplement the Code, if only interstitially, with sub-
stantive law. 
In bankruptcy, however, the federal statutory and incorpo-
rated state law are very comprehensive, and any constitutional or 
policy reasons for looking to state law for filler are strong. While 
federal common law can sometimes trump otherwise applicable 
state law when the federal interest in doing so is sufficiently 
strong, the Supreme Court has clearly held that state law is not 
easily trumped by federal common law created by bankruptcy 
judges.20 
Also, the Supreme Court has been equally clear that the 
Code's literal language must be followed closely so that proper oc-
casion for interpretative law is small. 21 Very little room is there-
fore left for making federal common law under the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
In any event, bankruptcy-made federal common law is not the 
sort of supplemental law that concerns us in this presentation. 
Bankruptcy judges create federal common law, whatever the 
source or reference, under and within the bounds of the bank-
ruptcy statute. Our concern is limited to judges' deciding or acting 
beyond, or different from, statutory provisions on the basis of gen-
eral authority apart from the provisions themselves. 
B. As A Matter Of State Law 
Bankruptcy courts more often create state common law. It 
happens whenever the courts look to state law for substantive 
rights and liabilities of the debtor and other parties. These rights 
and liabilities are almost always governed by state law. In con-
sulting state law for this purpose the bankruptcy courts make 
common law by interpreting applicable state statutes or by apply-
ing and developing pertinent state common law. 
This state common law is not, however, the true supplemental 
law that interests us. The bankruptcy courts are applying and are 
constrained by specific statutes, or they are projecting common 
law that is also limited by state statutory law and by local prece-
dent. Moreover, in creating state common law the bankruptcy 
19 28 u.s.c. § 151 (1999). 
20 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918 (1979). 
21 See generally Robert K Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textual-
ism: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993); Adam James 
Wiensch, Note, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code 
Law, 79 GEO. L.J. 1831, 1859 et seq. (1991). 
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courts are adding to state law on which the Bankruptcy Code op-
erates rather than to the Code itself. 
Sometimes an applicable state statute empowers courts to 
use, as a kind of supplemental law, state-law principles of com-
mon law and equity. The best example is Uniform Commercial 
Code section 1-103,22 which provides: 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the 
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and 
the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, es-
toppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, 
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall sup-
plement its provisions. 23 
Bankruptcy courts applying local U.C.C. law will rely on 1-103 as 
authority to supplement the statute with principles of common 
law and equity. This process, too, is enabled and constrained by 
state law and does not add supplemental law to the Bankruptcy 
Code. Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code can itself displace 
state law principles of common law and equity.24 
IV. BANKRUPI'CY COURTS AS COURTS OF EQUITY 
Separately, bankruptcy courts apply equitable principles to 
directly affect the Bankruptcy Code on the basis of the bankruptcy 
court's supposed (though foggy) status as a court of equity. Bank-
ruptcy courts are commonly described as being or having the pow-
ers of "courts of equity."25 Until recently, clear statutory support 
existed for this status. No longer. Today, any such support is, at 
best, uncertain and vague. 
The first federal bankruptcy law, the 1800 Act, gave bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction to the district courts. The second law, the 1841 
Act, also empowered the district courts to exercise this jurisdiction 
summarily in the nature of summary proceedings in equity. The 
district courts were thereby empowered to effectively act as equity 
courts for purposes of bankruptcy. The Supreme Court made 
clear that, absent this equitable jurisdiction power given by the 
1841 Act, "the District Courts of the United States possess no eq-
22 u.c.c. § 1-103. 
23 Id. 
24 In re Omegas Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 1443, 1452-53 (6th Cir. 1994) (State-law imposing 
constructive trust on property debtor obtained by fraud is inconsistent with goals of bank-
ruptcy and is displaced by bankruptcy law.). 
25 E.g., Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240, 54 S.Ct. 695, 697 (1934)("But otherwise 
courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity and their proceedings inherently pro-
ceedings in equity."); Kaiser Aerospace & Elec. Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 229 B.R. 860, 
871 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) ("Section 105(a)'s broad statutory directive that bankruptcy 
courts shall have the power to issue any order necessary to effectuate a Chapter 11 plan is 
consistent with the general understanding that these tribunals are courts of equity."). 
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uity jurisdiction whatsoever; for the previous legislation of Con-
gress conferred no such authority upon them."26 
The district courts' equity power in bankruptcy matters was 
explicitly continued under the 1867 Act27 and the 1898 Act. The 
critical language of the 1898 Act was the very first part - the in-
troductory part - of section 2: 
(T]he district courts of the United States * * * are hereby made 
courts of bankruptcy, and are hereby invested * * * with such 
jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise 
original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings * * * *. 
This language meant that "[a] bankruptcy court is a court of eq-
uity, ... guided by equitable doctrines and principles except in so 
far as they are inconsistent with the [bankruptcy statute]. "28 To 
be a court of equity means "at least* * *that, in the exercise of the 
jurisdiction conferred upon it, it [the bankruptcy court] applies the 
principles and rules of equity jurisprudence." 
More recently, in 1978, Congress enacted section 1481 of Title 
28 which provided in pertinent part that "[a] bankruptcy court 
shall have the powers of a court of equity." However, when the 
provisions of title 28 relating to bankruptcy courts were amended 
in 1984 making the bankruptcy court a "unit" of the district court, 
section 1481 was repealed.29 Accordingly, at present, nothing in 
the Bankruptcy Code or related statutes explicitly gives equity ju-
risdiction to bankruptcy courts that is different from or greater 
than the equity jurisdiction of a federal district court.30 
It is generally assumed, however, that, under the Code, bank-
ruptcy courts are equity courts31 and can apply equitable princi-
ples and rules. Section 105(a) is sometimes cited as the basis for 
this status and power.32 
26 Ex Parte, The City Bank of New Orleans in the Matter of William Christy, 44 U.S. 
292, 311-12 (1845). 
21 The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 again designated the district courts as courts of bank-
ruptcy but did not expressly provide for them to act in equity. It was implicit that in bank-
ruptcy, the district courts acted as courts of equity. 
28 SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455, 60 S. Ct. 1044, 
1053 (1940) (citing Bankruptcy Act § 2). 
29 See Industrial Tool Distrib., Inc., 55 B.R. 746, 749 fn.6 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985). 
so Cf. Robert A. Greenfield, The National Bankruptcy Conference's Position on the 
Court System Under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 and 
Suggestions for Rules Promulgation, 23 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 358, 360 (1986). 
31 E.g. United States v. Energy Resources, Inc., 495 U.S. 545, 549, 110 S.Ct. 2139, 109 
L. Ed. 2d 580 (1990); In re Nikoloutsos, 199 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2000); But for a very 
recent, thoughtful, very rare cautionary view, see generally Honorable Marcia A. Krieger, 
"The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity": What Does That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275 
(1999). 
32 Section 105 has been cited (probably wrongly) as independent authority for using 
supplemental equitable principles in bankruptcy. In re Momentum Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 
1132 (2d Cir. 1994) (Section 105 supports bankruptcy court applying the doctrine of equita-
ble e!!toppel.); In re Lapiana, 909 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1990) (Bankruptcy rights are subject to 
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It is simply not true that 105 is the basis for equity jurisdic-
tion of courts in bankruptcy. The legislative history of the section 
flatly reports that section 105(a) is "derived from"33 Bankruptcy 
Act section 2a(15). Reconsider the language of section 2: 
a. The courts of the United States hereinbefore defined as courts 
of bankruptcy are hereby created courts of bankruptcy and are 
hereby invested, within their respective territorial limits as now 
established or as they may be hereafter changed, with such ju-
risdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise 
original jurisdiction in proceedings under this Act, in vacation, 
in chambers, and during their respective terms, as they are now 
or may be hereafter held, to--(15) Make such orders, issue such 
process, and enter such judgments, in addition to those specifi-
cally provided for, as may be necessary for the enforcement of 
the provisions of this Act: Provided, however, That an injunction 
to restrain a court may be issued by the judge only; make such 
orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments in addition 
to those specifically provided for as may be necessary for the en-
forcement of the provisions of this Act.34 (emphasis added). 
The italicized prefatory language in section 2 is the statutory ba-
sis for bankruptcy courts' equitable power. Subsection 2a(15) did 
not itself give equity power to the bankruptcy courts. So, section 
105, as the modern successor of only subsection 2a(15), cannot it-
self give the courts this power. 
The congressional reports behind 105 also explain that "105 is 
similar in effect to the All Writs Statute, * * * under which the 
new bankruptcy courts are brought [separately] by amendment to 
28 U.S.C. 451 [which defines the meaning of court for purposes of 
title 28]."35 So, prior to 1984, when bankruptcy courts were sepa-
rate courts, separate legislation brought them under the All Writs 
Statute.36 Section 105 was redundant in this respect. Now, of 
course, the meaning of court in section 451 does not directly, ex-
plicitly include bankruptcy courts. So, the connection between 
105 and the All Writs Statute is completely empty. 
We believe that the All Writs Statute still applies to bank-
ruptcy courts, but only indirectly or derivatively as units of the 
federal district courts. Still, the All Writs Statute is not a source 
of equity power or other supplemental law. It is a source of pro-
cess only that must be closely related to fairly clear legislative 
intent. 
well-recognized equitable defenses, such as estoppel; and the courts possibly can create 
new equitable defenses.). 
33 S. REP. No. 95-989, at 51 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837; H.R. REP. 
No. 95-595, at 342 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6298. 
34 Bankr. Act § 2a(15); 11 U.S.C. § 12(a)(15) (repealed). 
35 H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1977). 
36 28 u.s.c. § 1651 (1994). 
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Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts exercise equity power. The 
putative basis may be the doubtful authority of 105; the murky 
authority of the long-ago merger of law and equity in federal 
courts;37 unsubstantiated case authority; or something else or 
nothing whatsoever. The truth is that even without citing author-
ity, bankruptcy courts act as courts of equity in the sense of acting 
as though they are empowered to apply equitable principles and 
rules. 
Equitable principles and rules, however, are not a source of 
general authority to act beyond or different from the Bankruptcy 
Code. So, even if there is a real and lawful basis for bankruptcy 
judges to assume the role of equity chancellors, this role gives 
them little legitimate reason or room to add substantive, supple-
mental law to the Bankruptcy Code. 
Equity does not empower the judge to create or depart from 
law in pursuit of conscience or morality. It is a subset of princi-
ples, rules, and remedies well constrained by hundreds of years of 
precedent that fairly precisely defines equity. The important prin-
ciples of equity were long ago all developed:38 
[E]quity became a system of positive jurisprudence, peculiar in-
deed, and differing from the common law, but founded upon and 
contained in the mass of cases already decided. The Chancellor 
was no longer influenced by his own conscience * * *. [Also,] * * 
* there can be no more capricious enlargement according to the 
will of individual chancellors. 39 
Although equitable principles can be adapted to novel conditions, 
"the broad and fruitful principles of equity have been established 
and cannot be changed by any judicial action. "40 
Moreover, these concrete principles are only applied to aid 
law, not to contradict law or even add to law. The Supreme Court 
forcefully made this point in its recent decision, Grupo Mexicano 
de Desarrollo SA v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,41 holding that the 
equity jurisdiction conferred on federal courts by the 1789 Judici-
ary Act did not empower a court to freeze assets for the benefit of 
creditors. The Court stated: 
We do not question the proposition that equity is flexible; but in 
the federal system, at least, the flexibility is confined within the 
37 The district courts, and presumably the bankruptcy courts operating as units of the 
district courts, "have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treatises of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1999). Because of the merger of 
law and equity in federal courts, some people interpret "civil actions" in section 1331 to 
encompass traditional equity jurisdiction. John F. Duffy, Administrative Coimmon Law in 
Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 147 n.173 (1998). 
38 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 59, at 75 (Spencer Symons, 5t1> ed. 1941). 
39 Id. at 75-76. 
40 Id. § 60, at 78. 
41 527 U.S. 308 (1999). 
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broad boundaries of traditional, equitable relief. To accord a 
type of relief that has never been available before - and espe-
cially (as here) a type of relief that has been specifically dis-
claimed by longstanding judicial precedent - is to invoke a 
"default rule," ... not of flexibility but of omnipotence.42 
17 
Clearly, equitable principles are subordinate and subservient 
to all law,43 including statutory law. So, especially when federal 
courts apply comprehensive federal statutes, the use of equity is 
triggered by, and strictly limited by, the letter and clear sense of 
the statutes. As courts of equity, therefore, bankruptcy courts are 
not empowered to go beyond or depart from the Bankruptcy Code 
and create supplemental law. 
V. SECTION 105(a) 
Collier and other secondary sources have classified and criti-
cized the cases construing section 105.44 Some of these reported 
decisions seem premised on the implicit if not explicit interpreta-
tion of section 105 as a direct, fresh, independent grant of supple-
mental power to the bankruptcy courts.45 
Under this broad interpretation, 105(a) does not re-state in-
herent or equitable powers of courts elsewhere provided and 
otherwise limited. Rather, through 105(a), Congress separately 
delegated to bankruptcy courts the authority to act to the limits of 
a wholly independent meaning of 105(a). 
Under this broad meaning, 105(a) could be interpreted as a 
basis of authority to fill in, extend, or retract the Bankruptcy Code 
in unprovided-for cases and unanticipated circumstances in ways 
that are beyond particular provisions but within the largest goals 
of bankruptcy. We can imagine appealing policy arguments that 
support giving bankruptcy courts such authority. 
We believe that some uses of 105(a) can only be explained by 
interpreting and applying the statute this way. Good examples 
are partial discharge of student loans,46 substantive consolida-
42 Id. at 333. 
43 Admittedly, though, distinguishing equity from common law is very artifical in that 
the worlds are largely merged by procedure and also by judicial legislation that has ab-
sorbed much of the former into the latter. For present purposes, distinguishing equity from 
common law is also pointless because there is no general, federal common law and also 
because we are entirely interested in the exercise of equitable powers within and under 
statutes. 
44 E.g., 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 'lI 105.01[2] (15th ed. 1999); Manuel D. Leal, The 
Power of the Bankruptcy Court: Section 105, 29 S. Tux. L. REv. 487 (1988). 
45 E.g., In re Morgan, 182 F.3d 775 (11th Cir. 1999) (tolling of priority period); In re 
Brown, 239 B.R. 204 (Bankr. S. D. Cal. 1999)(partial discharge of student loan). 
46 See generally Cara A. Morea, Note, Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy-It Is 
Time for a Unified Equitable Appraoch, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 193 (1998). 
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tion,47 payment of "necessary" unsecured claims early in a Chap-
ter 11 case,48 and permanently stretching the discharge to protect 
non-debtors. 49 
We do not say that these uses are bad bankruptcy policies. 
We do, however, say that such uses raise problems of statutory 
language and constitutional concepts. 
The problems of statutory language are straight-forward. 
Section 105 is limited to orders that "carry out the provisions of 
this title." Congress could have used the word "policies" or the 
word "purposes" in section 105. It did not.50 
The problems of constitutional concepts are different and 
more subtle. The constitutional problem is not so much in Con-
gress delegating wide powers to the courts through 105(a). The 
real problem is that in exercising such wide powers, the courts are 
making law to the extent of violating the constitutional separation 
of powers. It makes no difference that Congress may have desper-
ately wanted, clearly intended, and explicitly provided for the 
courts to have such power. Congress cannot widen the constitu-
tional limits of judicial power. 
The division of authority between the three branches of the 
federal government is not exact or clear, but is flexible. Their re-
sponsibilities can permissibly overlap to a point. The overlap is 
constitutionally too great, that is, the separation of powers is of-
fended, when the whole power of one branch is given to and exer-
cised by another branch; when excessive authority is accumulated 
in a single branch; or when the authority and independence of one 
or another coordinate branch is undermined. 51 
With respect to the judicial branch the special concerns are 
law that "impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of 
the Judicial Branch"52 or the assignment of "tasks that are more 
properly accomplished by [other] branches."53 So, when the Con-
47 See generally Mary Elizabeth Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering Substantive Consoli-
dation, 59 U. PrIT. L. REV. 381 (1998). 
48 See generally CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAw OF BANKRUPI'CY § 11.12 (1997). 
49 See generally Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigtion: A 
Critical Reappraisal of Non-debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 959 (1997). 
50 Some courts, however, seem to use the words "provisions" and "purposes" inter-
changeably. E.g., In re Gurny, 192 B.R. 529, 539 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996); In re Simmons, 224 
B.R. 879, 884 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998). See also In re Offshore Diving and Salvaging, Inc., 
1999 WL 961763 (E.D. La 1999) ("This court agrees that recognizing equitable power to toll 
Section 507 under § 105(a) does not violate any Bankruptcy Code provision or policy and is 
in fact consistent with Congressional policy. Accordingly, the Court affirms the bankruptcy 
court's determination that Section 105(a) is broad enough to provide for equitable tolling of 
the priority period in 507(a)."). 
51 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381, 109 S. Ct. 647, 659, 102 L. Ed. 2d 
714, 786 (1989). 
52 Id. at 383. 
53 Id. 
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gress delegates certain authority to the courts, the seemingly deci-
sive issue in terms of separation of powers is whether the 
particular authority is more properly exercised by another branch. 
It's a fuzzy scale generally that applies fully to law making. 
Courts cannot create law in the sense of exercising Article I legis-
lative power. On the other hand and at the other extreme, apply-
ing and interpreting legislation are necessary and essential 
judicial functions. In a sense, applying and interpreting law cre-
ates law (albeit not "supplemental law"). In sum, the rule is prob-
ably that courts cannot make law "except in conjunction with the 
lawful exercise of* * *judicial power."54 
In judging the legality of a court's role under a statute, the 
separation-of-powers issue is whether, on a flexible, fuzzy scale, 
the role exceeds lawful exercise of judicial power under the statute 
and thus becomes unconstitutional law making. We think it de-
pends in large part on the proximity between the court's "legisla-
tive" decisions under the statute and the clarity and precision of 
the policies expressed through the statute. 
The issue is whether the court's decision is necessary to a 
fairly specific and certain statutory intention that drives and 
guides the judge's decision making and her related actions. It is 
not enough, for separation of powers, that the court's decision is 
compatible with relatively undefined or general legislative pur-
poses, not even when these general purposes are clearly and force-
fully expressed. 
The likelihood of unconstitutional law-making by courts in 
applying statutes is directly related to the distance between the 
courts' decisions or actions under the statute and a well-defined 
congressional judgment about the matter behind the statute. The 
farther the stretch, the more likely judicial lawmaking is 
unconstitutional. 
So, the ultimate question about partial discharge and all 
other judicial supplements to the Bankruptcy Code is whether 
they are too much of a legislatively projected reach from the stat-
ute to the decision. If so, the supplements may violate the Consti-
tution even if they somehow satisfy the language of 105(a). 
It's possible, too, that such supplements are not saved by hav-
ing roots in traditional equity jurisprudence. Remember: we are 
not completely sure if, why, and to which extent bankruptcy 
courts are courts of equity. We are sure that even if they are fully 
courts of equity, this status gives little reason or room for making 
supplemental law. Also, it is never been entirely clear how far the 
Constitution permits the judicial branch, either on its own or 
through congressional grant, to exercise equitable power, but we 
54 Id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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cannot imagine that any such authority trumps Article I of the 
Constitution. Courts cannot exercise Article I legislative power 
directly through 105 or any other statute or indirectly through 
equity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For more than thirty years and in thousands of reported 
cases, bankruptcy judges and lawyers have thought about section 
105. They have thought about 105 in terms of statutory interpre-
tation, in terms of legislative history, in terms of other reported 
decisions, in terms of bankruptcy policy, in terms of doing equity. 
We recognize that these cases are of real importance and value to 
the bench and bar, which is why we are developing a Web site that 
collects all of these cases and also collects other supplemental law 
authorities. 
We suggest, however, that from now on, judges and lawyers 
should also think of 105 in constitutional terms. We join the call 
of Professor Robert F. Nagel of the University of Colorado Law 
School who, writing more than 20 years ago about the limits of 
federal courts' equitable remedies generally, urged: "[l]egal com-
mentators and courts should begin the potentially constructive 
business of deciding how separation of powers applies to the scope 
of equitable relief in particular cases. "55 
Finally, we suggest that judges and lawyers also think of sec-
tion 105 in musical terms when deciding how the section fits 
within the whole of the Bankruptcy Code. We join the lament of 
the Oak Ridge Boys in their gospel classic, Rhythm Guitar: 
Nobody wants to play rhythm guitar behind Jesus. 
It seems like everybody wants to be the lead singer in the band 
I know it's hard to get a beat on what's divine 
When everybody's pushing toward the head of the line 
I don't think that its working out at all the way He planned. 
We suggest that, musically and constitutionally, section 105 is at 
most a rhythm guitar.56 
55 Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Reme-
dies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661, 724 (1978). 
56 While we both agree that section 105 corresponds to a rhythm guitar, at least one of 
the authors is ill-equipped to identify what corresponds to Jesus. 
